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The Business Exemption of § 110(5) of the Copyright
Act Violates International Treaty Obligations under
Trips: Will Congress Honor its Commitments?
By Charles Leininger*

I. INTRODUCTION

Next time you walk into your favorite community coffee shop,
take a moment to observe your surroundings. Steaming coffee is
being served in dozens of aromatic flavors to students, would-be
philosophers, out-of-work actors, and working people simply seeking
to wake up before their daily shift. A few friends sit around a table
laughing over childhood stories. Two elderly men are deeply
engaged in an epic game of chess. On the walls are paintings by as
yet unknown local artists. A ficus tree in the comer adds the feeling
of the outdoors. Hanging from the ceiling are tracks of soft lighting
warmly glowing the room.
Now, focus your ears on the sounds you hear. Listen beyond the
idle chitchat of fellow coffee shop regulars. Listen beyond the
grinding sounds of blended cappuccinos. Listen to the music being
played over speakers placed above your head. Maybe you are
kicking back to some light jazz or grooving to Motown classics. This
music adds to the atmosphere and makes your experience much more
pleasurable. Maybe you will stay a little longer for another cup of
coffee or even a tasty pastry. Whether it is a conscious decision or
not, one of the reasons you are a regular at this particular coffee shop
is because of the music.
As you nod your head in rhythm, consider one question: Who is
* J.D. candidate, 2006, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.S., 2003,
University of Southern California. I wish to thank all my family and friends for
their generous support and endless patience given during the writing of this article.
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paying for this? No tickets are being sold. There is no cover charge
at the door. Like the whipped cream on your cappuccino, the music
you hear is provided at no additional charge to you, the customer.
But are the artists who performed the music being compensated for
their creative endeavors? Are the songwriters collecting royalties for
the public performance of their works? If there is no direct charge to
you, the customer, is the owner of the coffee shop paying for the
privilege of playing music for her customers? Should she be required
to pay anything at all? Under United States copyright law, there is a
good chance the answer is "No". While the exclusive right to
publicly perform a copyrighted work lies solely with its author, there
is an exception provided under 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) of the Copyright
Act. This exception is divided into two parts commonly called the
"homestyle exemption" and the "business exemption."
In 2000, the European Communities ("EC") brought a claim
against the United States alleging that both the "homestyle" and
"business" exemptions of § 110(5) of the Copyright Act violated
provisions of the Berne Convention on copyright as incorporated into
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")
agreement.' A World Trade Organization ("WTO") Dispute Panel
found that the United States had violated its international treaty
obligations under the Agreement on TRIPS because of the "business
exemption" enacted under the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of
1998 ("FMLA"), which amended § 110(5) of the Copyright Act of
1976, but not the homestyle exemption. 2 It found the business
exemption greatly expanded the scope of the original homestyle
exemption, which protected small businesses, such as restaurants,
from requirements that forced them to pay license fees to performing
rights organizations for performances of copyrighted works over
small "homestyle" stereo systems. 3
The Dispute Panel recommended that the United States amend or
repeal the legislation to bring it in compliance with the TRIPS
Until the matter could be further resolved, an
Agreement.4
1. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS 160/K (June 15, 2000) (adopted July 27, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report].

2. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 69.
6.131, 6.145. See discussion infra Part
3. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
V.B. 1(a-b) and accompanying notes.
4. Id.
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arbitration award of approximately $1.1 million per year was given to
the European Communities as compensation.5 Congress has
successfully delayed making a final decision as to what it will do to
correct the issue. The United States will face increasing antipathy
from its trading partners, however, if nothing is done to resolve the
matter, especially in the realm of intellectual property protections.
This paper will review the historical development of the § 110(5)
exemptions, analyze the WTO Dispute Panel's decision, and explore
the various options available to Congress as it seeks to find a
solution.
II. PRE- 1976 COPYRIGHT HISTORY
Each time a song is played over the radio, there are several
underlying performances of the work: the original recorded
performance by the artist, the performance of the record over the air
by a radio station, and the performance of the radio signal reproduced
by the user's stereo system. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, either
the performance by the radio station or by the stereo owner would be
deemed an infringement of the copyright held by the original
performer in their recorded work if the performance was
unauthorized, public, and for profit. This concept of having several
"performances" contained in each rebroadcast of a radio signal
originated as the doctrine of multiple performances6 in the 1931
Supreme Court case Buck v. Jewell-LaSalleRealty Co..
In that case, Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. operated a hotel in Kansas
City, Missouri, that broadcasted music over a master radio receiver
wired to loudspeakers in public and private rooms. 7 Having no
contractual or other arrangement with any broadcasting stations, the
hotel picked up radio signals from the air and re-played them for its

5. Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act - Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU,

WT/DS160/ARB25/l (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Award of the Arbitrators]. The
Dispute Settlement Body elected to not consider music broadcast through the
Internet in its calculation. Id. at 4.35. See discussion infra note 238 and
accompanying text.
6. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
7. Id. at 195.
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patrons. 8 Without permission, a local radio station broadcasted
several popular songs, which were in turn re-broadcast by the hotel. 9
Gene Buck, president of the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"), and the owners of the
0
copyrighted songs sued Jewell-LaSalle for copyright infringement.'
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit certified to the
Supreme Court the question of whether these facts constituted a
Writing for the Court,
performance under the Copyright Act."
Justice Brandeis answered that nothing in the Act limited a work's
rendition to a single performance by a ratio station; therefore, the
rebroadcast of the work by the hotel constituted an additional,
secondary performance.' 2 The concept that both primary and
secondary performances of a single work could exist simultaneously
became known as the multiple performances doctrine.
Furthermore, Justice Brandeis argued that, while radio waves are
not themselves audible, the act of converting them into an audible
frequency is "essentially a reproduction" of the original rendition of
the work and so constitutes a secondary performance under the Act.' 3
Brandeis' analysis is problematic, however, because the statutory
language in the Copyright Act provides for separate rights of

8. Id.
9. Id. The alleged copyright infringements were for the musical compositions
"Just Imagine" and "I'm Winging Home (Like A Bird That Is On The Wing)".
Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929).
10. ASCAP held the exclusive non-dramatic performing rights in these
compositions.
11. The question certified to the Supreme Court was:
Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his
guests, through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and
loud speakers installed in his hotel and under his control and for
the entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted
musical composition which has been broadcast from a radio
transmitting station, constitute a performance of such a
composition within the meaning of 17 [U.S.C.] Sec. 1(e)?
Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 195-96.
12. Id. at 198.
13. Id. at 200. Justice Brandeis analogized using a mechanical device to
reproduce sounds recorded on a phonorecord with a radio receiver used to
reproduce sounds transferred in radio waves. Id. In both situations, reproduction
amounts to a performance. Id. at 201.
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reproduction and performance. 14 The reproduction of sound waves
itself is not what constitutes a performance; rather, the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to both "play" and "perform" a
"record." The person receiving the radio broadcast therefore does
not perform the record itself, but instead reproduces the transmission.
While flawed in a technical sense, this was the rule until the 1960s
when the advent of cable television raised the issue again.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the
Supreme Court held the functions of a cable television system did not
constitute a "performance" within the meaning of Sections l(c) and
l(d) of the 1909 Act as generally recognized in a conventional sense
or as envisioned by Congress when it enacted the law.' 5 Fortnightly
Corporation, the owner and operator of community antenna
television ("CATV") systems in West Virginia, broadcasted several
movies whose copyrights were held by United Artists.16 United
Artists had granted licenses to five television stations to broadcast the
Corporation to rebroadcast them over
movies, but not to Fortnightly
7
network.
CATV
its
Disregarding the Jewell-LaSalle holding as "a questionable 35year-old decision that in actual practice has not been applied outside
its own factual context,"' 8 the Court found that Fortnightly's system
simply enhanced the viewer's ability to receive the broadcasters'
signals and was therefore not a performance.' 9 Thus, the audience is
not completely passive because it must use television sets and
receiving equipment to view the signal. This serves as an act
performed by the private viewer rather than the cable system
operator.2 °
Several years later, the holding in Fortnightly was challenged on
grounds that cable television technology had greatly expanded and
cable transmissions were now sent over greater distances using relay

14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
15. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
16. Id. at 391.
17. Id. at 393.
18. Id. at401 n.30.
19. Id. at 400-01.
20. Id. at 400.
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technology. 2 1
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Teleprompter Corp, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that because Teleprompter's CATV system was intercepting CBS
broadcasts from television stations some distance away and then
channeling them to its subscribers, it was no longer merely enhancing
the viewer's capacity to receive signals. As such, the court held it
should be treated as any other display to a public audience otherwise
unable to view a work.22
However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision by holding
"the reception and re-channeling of these signals for simultaneous
viewing [was] essentially a viewer function," regardless of distance
between broadcaster and viewer. 23 As applied to cable television
transmissions, the multiple performances doctrine was effectively
replaced by a test focusing on the dichotomy between broadcaster
and viewer "functions." 24 Thus, Fortnightly and Teleprompter
effectively limited the doctrine of multiple performances to the realm
of radio transmissions as originally applied in Jewell-LaSalle. In
1975, the Supreme Court all but eliminated the doctrine in Twentieth
25
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.
In that case, George Aiken owned a fast-food restaurant in
downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania called "George Aiken's
Chicken," where he played music for customers' enjoyment through
26
a radio wired to four speakers installed in the restaurant's ceiling.
ASCAP demanded that he pay performing rights license fees on the
basis that he was playing multiple performances under Jewell-

21. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 394 (1974). See also infra note 23 and accompanying text
for the Supreme Court's reversal.
22. Id.
23. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).

The Court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that cable television operators
should be considered "broadcasters" and therefore performers of programming they
did not create. Id. at 410.

24. One criticism of this distinction is that placing the burden of investing in
the complex and costly technology required to import signals from great distances
solely on the viewer side of the dichotomy is unrealistic and overly restrictive.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.18(A) (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004).
25. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
26. Id. at 152.
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LaSalle; Aiken refused. 27 In a seven-to-two ruling, the Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that Fortnightly, not JewellLaSalle, controlled.2 8 It held the act of picking up radio signals out
of the air and re-transmitting them through stereo speakers was not a
performance and so did not require a license. 29 Aiken fell on the
"viewer's" side under Fortnightly and so there was no performance
separate from and in addition to the original radio broadcast.
In its decision, the Court determined that it would be highly
impractical to require strict enforcement of a law labeling the large
number of proprietors of small establishments such as Aiken's30
"copyright infringers" for their failure to pay license fees.
Furthermore, it would be inequitable to rule that someone listening to
the radio "performs" every broadcast he or she receives. 31 Someone
in Aiken's position could have no way of determining whether the
primary broadcaster held proper licensing to broadcast copyrighted
works, nor would he have the ability to foresee or control a broadcast
of works licensed through performing rights societies or individuals

27. ASCAP is a membership association that licenses and distributes royalties
for the non-dramatic public performances of the copyrighted works held by over
200,000 U.S. composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music publishers.
ASCAP.com, About ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Sept.27,
2005). Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers ("SESAC") are similar performing rights organizations that collect
license fees on behalf of their members. See BMI, The BMI Backgrounder,
http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) and
SESAC, About Us, http://www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/about/html (last visited Sept.
27, 2005). Both the petitioners and the radio stations in question were members of
ASCAP. Aiken was not, however, a member. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 153. The
ASCAP license agreement with the radio station contained a provision limiting the
radio station from granting to third parties the right to reproduce or perform
publicly for profit ASCAP licensed musical compositions, or to authorize a third
party receiver to perform or reproduce a radio broadcast to the public for profit. Id.
at 153. Note that Aiken did not directly charge customers for listening to his radio.
28. See Aiken, 422 U.S. 151. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas
dissented. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 162. The Court noted that ASCAP reported some 5,150 registered
establishments nationwide, but as a matter of "policy" or "practice" did not make
any attempts to exact licensing from commercial establishments using radios with a
single speaker. Id. at 162 n.12.
31. Id. at 162-63.

618

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

25-2

other than ASCAP.32 Additionally, the Court felt it was inequitable
to allow copyright owners to require licenses from a great number of
establishments for what is effectively a single public rendition of the
copyrighted work (i.e., a single broadcast to a large area by one radio
station), and thus would go beyond what is necessary to ensure their
33
economic protection.
However, the Court refused to subject Jewell-LaSalle's fate to the
history books by overruling it. Instead, it made the factual distinction
that the radio broadcaster in Jewell-LaSalle did not hold the required
performance license, whereas the broadcaster in Aiken did.34 A
finding of multiple performances could still be found under JewellLaSalle if the broadcaster was unlicensed, but not under Aiken if the
broadcaster was licensed.35 This decision is problematic, however,
because the owner of an establishment such as Aiken's generally will
not know whether the radio broadcaster holds proper licensing to
play copyrighted works; thus, the owner could still be held liable for
infringement under the Copyright Act if the original broadcaster of
the transmission does not hold proper licensing. Nevertheless, the
Aiken holding became the basis for an exemption under the
Copyright Act of 1976 given to business proprietors who broadcast
works in their establishments using equipment similar to what might
be found in a common household.
III.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF

1976

AND THE §

110(5) EXEMPTION

A. Copyright Act of 1976
Shortly after the Aiken ruling, Congress vastly overhauled U.S.
copyright law with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.36
Partly in response to Aiken, Congress defined a "performance" to

32. Id. at 163.
33. Id. at 162. The Court noted that such a result would "be wholly at odds
with the balanced congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1(e)." Id. at 163.
34. Id. at 160.
35. The Aiken decision thus deprived Jewell-LaSalle of much of its meaning,
with the result that Jewell-LaSalle only applies "if the broadcast being
retransmitted was itself unlicensed." 17 U.S.C. § 110 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 941476 (1976)).
36. The Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect January 1, 1978.
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include those works played on devices such as a radio. 37 Although
the Act did not introduce express rights in secondary transmissions, it
gave definitions for primary and secondary transmissions.38 The
House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act explained that
what makes a transmitter "secondary" is the process of picking up
and retransmitting signals produced by a "primary" transmitter.3 9 For
a secondary transmission to be considered a copyright infringement,
it must be a performance separate from and in addition to the
performance by the primary transmitter.
The Act did not, however, specifically include secondary
transmissions within the definition of a performance.4" Neither did it
include secondary transmissions in the definition of a "public"
performance. 4 1 Because of this omission, both definitions might be
read to apply solely to primary transmissions. Despite this textual

37. Cass County Music Co. v. Vasfi Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir.
1995).
38. A "primary transmission" is defined as "a transmission made to the public
by the transmitting facility whose signals are being received and further transmitted
by the secondary transmission service, regardless of where or when the
performance or display was first transmitted." 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (2004). A
"secondary transmission" is defined as "the further transmitting of a primary
transmission simultaneously with the primary transmission." Id.
39. H.R. REP. No. 98-934 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 465,
4658.
40. Under the Act:
to perform a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it,
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the
case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
41. To perform or display a work "publicly" means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times.
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ambiguity, however, in examining House Report No. 98-934,
Congress appears to have intended that secondary transmissions
should constitute additional performances: "[A] cable television
system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its
subscribers. 42
By making secondary transmissions "performances" under the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress implicitly reintroduced the doctrine
of multiple performances. This established that, in order to play
music for their patrons, operators of public establishments must
obtain proper authorization through licensing or some other means,
with a few exceptions such as the one found in § 110(5) of the Act.
Section 110(5) of the 1976 Act, commonly referred to as the
"homestyle" or "Aiken" exemption, exempts "small commercial
establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises
standard radio or television equipment and turn it on for their
customers' enjoyment."4 Congress intended this provision to deal
with situations like Aiken's to "exempt from copyright liability
anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or
television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members
of the public for private use." 44 It reasoned that:
[T]he secondary use of the transmission by turning on
42. H.R. REP. No. 98-934. See also the Congressional reference to secondary
transmissions as "something extra (which) could be considered as a 'performance,'
or as an alternative to a performance." NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 24, at §
8.18(B) n.55 (citing 122 CONG. REc. H 10,904 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (statement
of Rep. Danielson)). Although unlikely, a court might still follow Fortnightly
despite the House Report because the Act fails to expressly designate a secondary
transmission as a performance. Id. at § 8.18(B).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976). "The basic rationale of this clause is that
the secondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public
is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be imposed." Id.
44. See id. By including an exemption for small commercial establishments,
Congress
acknowledged its practical wisdom in exempting the playing of a
single radio: The § 110(5) exemption will allow the use of
ordinary radios and television sets for the incidental
entertainment of patrons in small businesses or other professional
establishments, such as taverns, lunch counters, hairdressers, dry
cleaners, doctors' offices, etc.
Cass County, 55 F.3d at 266-67 (quoting S. REP. No. 983 (1974)).

Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act
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an ordinary receiver in public is so remote and
minimal that no further liability should be imposed.
In the vast majority of these cases no royalties are
collected today, and the exemption should be made
explicit in the statute. This clause has nothing to do
with cable television systems and the exemptions
is
would be denied in any case where the audience
45
charged directly to see or hear the transmission.
Although the Aiken holding served as the model for the § 110(5)
exemption, the Committee considered it to represent the "outer limit
of the exemption, and believe[d] that the line should be drawn at that
point.",46 While it would "exempt small commercial establishments
whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard radio or
television equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment,"
the statute would "impose liability where the proprietor has a
commercial 'sound system' installed or converts a standard home
receiving apparatus into the equivalent of a commercial sound
47
system.,
Furthermore, the Committee indicated that factors to be
considered should include: (1) the "size, physical arrangement, and
noise level" of areas where the transmission could be heard or seen;
and (2) the "extent to which the receiving apparatus is altered or
augmented for the purpose of improving the aural or visual quality of
the performance for individual members of the public using those
areas."4 8 In subsequent litigation, courts relied heavily on Aiken in
resolving various issues such as what types of sound systems fell
within the statute 49 and what sizes of establishments could qualify for
45. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976).
46. Id. Namely, the exception is limited to the use by a small commercial
establishment of a home receiver with four ordinary loudspeakers positioned
relatively close together with the receiver. Id.
47. Id

48. Id.
49. See Little Mole Music v. Mavar's Supermarket, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1209, 121314 (N.D. Ohio 1989); Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1539, 1542 (D.
Me. 1989); Merrill v. County Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.N.H. 1987);
Merrill v.Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (denying exemption to ceiling-mounted speakers located thirty feet apart);
1987), aff'd, 855
Int'l. Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. I11.
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the exemption, 50 as well as whether the purpose for the usage 5 1 and
the ability to pay licensing fees52 should be considered.53
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques,
Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether "a store manager (or corporate owner) perform[s] a
work publicly when she merely receives and plays those radio signals
for the benefit of her customers."5 " Claire's Boutiques owned and
operated a chain of retail stores, 56 which used small sound systems to

F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (denying exemption when eight speakers used); Rodgers
v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1985). But see
Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (six
speakers placed on poles at outdoor miniature golf course found inferior to most
home systems and scarcely audible, even at close range).
50. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (the
average size of establishments of 3,500 square feet was enough to justify
withholding the exemption even if the nature of the apparatus did not).
51. See Rodgers 617 F. Supp. at 1022 (store's contention that it used music
primarily to muffle industrial noise rather than for workers' enjoyment held to be
irrelevant).
52. For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Claire's Boutiques, the Seventh
Circuit refused to hold Claire's financial ability to pay license fees irrelevant
because to do so would possibly contradict several other cases, but viewed the
ability as at most an alternative basis for reaching a decision. Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1494 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Crabshaw
Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763, 767 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (noting
that the restaurant grossed between $800,000 and $900,000 in revenues); Bill
Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. at 1176 (defendants were of a
sufficient size to justify a subscription to a commercial background music system);
County Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp. at 1170 (defendant's $2.5 million revenue stream
shows it is not a small commercial establishment). But see Edison Bros. Stores,
Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419, 1424 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[Congress] did
not even qualify the exemption by limiting its availability to a 'small commercial
establishment,' the language of the legislative history. The statute focuses on the
equipment being used, and so must we.").
53. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 24, at § 8.18(C)(2)(a).
54. Claire's,949 F.2d at 1482.
55.Id. at 1486.
56. Claire's owned and operated 719 stores under the name "Claire's
Boutiques" and thirty stores under the name "Arcadia." The Claire's stores ranged
from 458 square feet to 2,000 square feet in size with an average size of 861 feet,
with 628 stores smaller than 1,055 square feet in size. The Arcadia stores averaged
2,022 square feet in size. Claire's,949 F.2d at 1484-85.
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broadcast radio music to customers.57

After Claire's refused to

purchase a performance license from Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"),
the performing rights organization sued the retail chain for copyright
infringement.5 8 In its analysis, the court reviewed each element of
the § 110(5) exemption to determine whether Claire's conduct
satisfied its requirements. The court stated that "the exemption is
available only if (1) a single receiving apparatus is used, (2) the
receiving apparatus is of a kind commonly used in private homes, (3)
the transmission is provided free of charge, and (4) the transmission
is not 'further transmitted' to the public. 59
First, the court looked at whether the phrase "single receiving
apparatus" applied to each store individually, or whether it could be
applied to all stores in the aggregate as BMI suggested. 60 Because
the statute referred to a single performance of a single work, the court
reasoned its analysis should be limited to each performance in stores
individually rather than the total number of performances at all stores
taken together. 6 Therefore, by using a single receiving device in
each of its stores, Claire's satisfied that element of the exemption. 62

57 Claire's supplied the following stereo components to each store: one Radio
Shack Optimus STA-20 5-watt stereo receiver, two Realistic Minimus 7 speakers,
an indoor antenna, and speaker wire. Each system was installed according to
company specifications. Id. at 1485.
58. BMI offered to issue Claire's a license at $240 for the first location and
$45 to $60 for each additional location. The annual license fee would have
amounted to $40,385 with an average of $53.92 per store. Id. at 1486. In response,
Claire's counter-offered to license only stores exceeding 1,055 square feet in size if
BMI agreed to not seek licenses for smaller stores. BMI rejected the counter-offer
and brought suit against Claire's alleging eighty-eight counts of copyright
infringement, claiming that, while these smaller stores would on their own fall
within the exemption, they should be licensed when taken together in the
aggregate. Id. at 1489. The district court granted Claire's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F.
Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990). BMI then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. Claire's,949 F.2d at 1482.
59. Claire's,949 F.2d at 1489.
60. Id. at 1489-91. The court noted that whereas other exemptions granted
under the Copyright Act specified who might be covered, § 110(5) omitted any
such designation. Id. at 1490. Therefore, anyone, including corporations, could
benefit from the exemption. Id.
61. Id. at 1490-91.
62. Id. The court further noted that, had Claire's itself broadcast music to each
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Next, the court addressed whether a business's size and ability to
pay background music license fees should preclude coverage under
the exemption. 63 It reasoned this issue of economic equity was
irrelevant, because the statutory language and surrounding legislative
history only dealt with the physical size of the establishment and the
size and type of sound equipment used.64 Therefore, any rule taking
into account a company's financial strength would run contrary to the
legislative intent behind § 110(5).65
The court then examined each sound system component
separately, as well as the system overall, to determine whether it fell
within the exemption.66 Judge Cummings explained that "the
important considerations in determining whether a system is hometype are the type and sophistication of the equipment used, the size of
the area in which the broadcast is audible, and whether the equipment
has been altered, augmented, or integrated in some fashion." 67 He
found Claire's sound systems satisfied these requirements because
they were comprised of small components broadcasting over a small
area and were not augmented or improved in any way.68
Finally, the court looked at whether Claire's had further
transmitted the radio broadcasts it received by using "some device or
process that expands the normal limits of the receiver's
capabilities." 69 Employing no such device, Claire's was found to
satisfy this requirement.7 °
In its decision, the court determined that Congress "was not so
much concerned with whether an establishment could afford a license
but rather with whether the nature of the sound system was such that
the performance it renders is more justly considered public in the
store rather than allowing them to individually choose which radio stations to
rebroadcast, the company would become more akin to a radio station or broadcaster
and would lose protection under the exemption. Id. at 1490.
63. Id. at 1491-92.
64. Claire's, 949 F.2d at 1491. The court noted other cases where the fiscal
issue was addressed, but were ultimately decided on other grounds. See id. at 1492.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1494.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1495.
70. Id.
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common-sense, if not technical copyright, notion of that term.",7 1 It
found the sound system employed by Claire's to fall within the
proper usage intended by Congress for exemption under § 110(5).72
Finding itself unsuccessful in the Seventh Circuit, BMI turned to
the Eighth Circuit with the case of Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v.
Broadcast Music, Inc. in the hopes of obtaining a more favorable
ruling.73 For the 220 of its 2,500 retail clothing and shoe stores that
contained sophisticated audio and video equipment, Edison paid
license fees to BMI and other performing rights organizations for
music played in those stores. 74 It refused to pay license fees for the
other stores in the retail chain, claiming an exemption under § 110(5)
because those establishments used a single radio receiver with two
attached shelf speakers pursuant to Edison company policy. 75 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that radio systems
used in these stores fell within the homestyle exemption.76
BMI raised many of the same claims it made in Claire's. First, in
deciding whether the exemption applies, the court asserted that it
would "consider the equipment of any one owner in toto, and not on
a per-store basis., 77 Choosing to focus on whether each store
satisfied the homestyle exemption on its own, the court rejected this
argument saying:
[S]ection 110(5) does not say that a person, company,
or other entity must own or operate only a single
receiver to qualify for the exemption; it refers to "the
communication of a transmission embodying a
performance ... of a work." We think it obvious that
78
the language refers to a single location.

71. Id. at 1495-96.
72. Id.

73. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir.
1992).
74. Id. at 1420-21.
75. Id. at 1420. The policy required use of "[o]nly simple, low grade radioonly receivers" with two attached portable box speakers placed within fifteen feet
of the receiver. Id.
76. Id. at 1421.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1422 (emphasis in original).
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Second, BMI asserted that because the physical size of Edison's
stores exceeded that of Aiken's store (1,055 square feet), the chain
lost protection under the exemption. 79 For support, BMI pointed to
the House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which considered the
factual situation in Aiken to "represent the outer limit of the
[homestyle] exemption." 80 It also asserted that Edison's financial
should preclude it from
ability to pay license fees for all its stores
8
'
exemption.
the
under
protection
asserting
Rejecting both arguments, the court found nothing in either the
statutory language or the legislative and judicial history that
suggested Congress intended to include a "size-and-financial-means
test" as part of the exemption. 82 Nothing in the exemption required
an establishment to be smaller than Aiken's store, nor was the ability
to pay license fees relevant.83 As support, the court noted that neither
the applicable factual situation described in the House Report nor the
Aiken case made any mention of a specific minimum square footage
requirement. 84 In looking at other cases on the issue, the court
similarly found that establishment size was never the determining
factor in applying the homestyle exemption.85 Not even the original
§ 110(5) text itself made mention of specific physical size
requirements, which easily could have86been included had Congress
intended it to be a determinative factor.
Finally, BMI contested the district court's decision on the
grounds that it violated the United States' international obligations

79. Edison, 954 F.2d at 1422.
80. Id. at 1423 (citation omitted). See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text.
81. Id. at 1424.
82. Id. at 1425.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1423. The court further noted that the physical size of Aiken's shop
was not given in a published opinion until Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
85. Edison, 954 F.2d at 1424. House Report 94-1476 focused on "the quality
of the sound system used, and not to the square footage of the establishment using
it." Edison, 954 F.2d at 1424 (citation omitted).
86. Id.
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under Article 1Ibis of the Berne Convention. 87 In rejecting this
argument, the court noted that the district court had not expanded the
scope of § 110(5); rather it simply followed the exemption's statutory
language, which Congress had declared to comply with international
88
treaty obligations.
While BMI failed to convince the circuit courts in Claire's and
Edison Brothers that the defendants should be denied the homestyle
exemption, ASCAP was somewhat more successful in Cass County
Music Company v. Muedini, which was brought on appeal before the
Seventh Circuit Court. 89 In that case, Vasfi Muedini owned the Port
Town Family Restaurant in Racine, Wisconsin, where he played
radio broadcasts for customers. 90 Muedini refused to pay the yearly
$327 fee ASCAP required. 91 Unlike the systems used in Claire'sand
Edison, Muedini's system was found to be more substantial than the
typical home stereo system and therefore did not qualify for the
Because of the implementation of
homestyle exemption. 92
transformers, the receiver was able to power forty speakers, thirty-six
more than what it was designed to handle. 93 However, the court
refused to decide whether a certain limit on the number of speakers
should be read into § 110(5) by noting that what is considered "'a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes' must be determined on a case-by-case basis." 94

Thus, the

should be a deciding
extent to which an audio system is augmented
95
factor in the outcome of each dispute.
87. Id. at 1425-26. BMI also argued the district court's opinion expanded the
scope of the homestyle exemption intended by Congress. The circuit court rejected
this argument on grounds that the district court simply followed the statutory
language. Id. at 1425.
88. Id. at 1426.
89. Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995). After the
defendant failed to respond to the complaint, the plaintiffs moved for default
judgment, which the district court granted. See Cass County Music Co. v.
Muedini, 821 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
90. Cass County, 55 F.3d at 264-65.
91. Id. at 265.
92. Id. at 269.
93. Id. at 268 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816,
817 (9th Cir. 1982)). For a complete description of the system, see id. at 268-69.
94. Id. at 268-69.
95. See id.
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B. Fairnessin Music Licensing Act of 1998
In 1998, Congress once again overhauled U.S. copyright law with
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act ("FMLA"). 96 The FMLA recodified the original exemption of § 110(5) in the 1976 Act as §
110(5)(A) 97 - the "homestyle exemption" - and added specific

requirements regarding

non-dramatic

musical works

under

§

110(5)(B) - the "business exemption."
The current business exemption under § 110(5)(B) is limited in
scope to non-dramatic musical works and to those performances
"intended to be received by the general public, originated by a radio
or television broadcast station..: or, if an audiovisual transmission,

by a cable system or satellite carrier." 98 The statute further separates
food service
and drinking
establishments from "other
establishments." 99 Food service and drinking establishments qualify

96. Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The Act
took effect Jan. 25, 1999. Id. at § 207, 112 Stat. at 2833 ("shall take effect 90 days
after the date of the enactment"). The FMLA was passed as a concession to the
restaurant lobby after it held up passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998.
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 24,
§
8.18(C)(2)(b).
Although neither the House nor the Senate resisted, various
legislators and the executive branch criticized it for various reasons, including fears
that it would result in violations of international obligations. See id.
97. The only change from the original § 110(5) was the addition of the words
"except as provided in subparagraph (B)." Compare 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2000)
with 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976 & Supp. III).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000).
99. Id. A "food service or drinking establishment" is defined as:
a restaurant, inn, bar, tavern, or any other similar place of
business in which the public or patrons assemble for the primary
purpose of being served food or drink, in which the majority of
the gross square feet of space that is nonresidential is used for
that purpose, and in which non-dramatic musical works are
performed publicly.

§ 101.
An "establishment" is defined as:
a store, shop, or any similar place of business open to the general
public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in
which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is
nonresidential is used for that purpose, and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly.
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if smaller than 3,750 gross square feet of space; if the establishment
is larger, it may have no more than six loudspeakers, of which no
more than four may be in any one room or adjoining outdoor space,
and a maximum of four audiovisual devices no larger than fifty-five
inches across diagonally may be used with no more than one such
device in a single room. 00 For other establishments, the exemption
applies where the space is less than 2,000 gross square feet,1 or if it
satisfies the same equipment specifications as for restaurants.
In addition, no direct charge may be made to see or hear the
transmission; it may not be retransmitted beyond the establishment
and must be licensed by0 2the copyright owner of the material being
performed or displayed. 1
Within days of the FMLA's enactment, the European
Communities filed a complaint with the WTO alleging the revision to
§ 110(5) of the 1976 Act violated United States commitments under
the Berne Convention on copyright as incorporated into the TRIPS
a WTO dispute resolution panel issued its report
Agreement. In02000,
1 3
matter.
the
on

IV. BRIEF

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATED TO

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Before analyzing the WTO Panel Report on § 110(5), this article
will briefly summarize historical developments in the administration
of international copyright law. In 1886, the Berne Convention for the

100. § 110(5)(B)(ii). Square footage excludes space used solely for customer
parking. If the performance is by audio means only, a maximum of six
loudspeakers may be used, of which at most four speakers may be used in any one
room or adjoining outdoor space. If the performance is by audiovisual means, no
more than four audiovisual devices may be used in total, with no more than one in
each room and with a maximum diagonal size of fifty-five inches. Any audio
portion of the performance or display must fall within the same loudspeaker
limitations as for those performances that are only by audio means. Id.
101. § 110(5)(B)(i).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iii)-(v) (2000). This last requirement means that
the operator of the establishment could be held liable for copyright infringement
should the broadcaster transmit the work without a proper license.
103. Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and
Economic Analysis of the Fairnessin Music LicensingAct, 80 B.U. L. REv. 93, 99
(2000).
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Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention")
became the first major international copyright agreement to focus on
helping nationals of member states "obtain international protection of
their rights to control, and receive payments for, the use of their
creative works."' 0 4 The United International Bureaux for the
Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI"), originally founded in
1893 to administer the Berne Convention, later formed the basis for
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in 1970."05
WIPO was later named an agency of the United Nations ("UN") and
given the mandate to administer intellectual0 6property matters,
including copyrights, among UN member States.'
The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT"), formed
in 1948, provides rules governing international trade between
member States.' 0 7 It has undergone several revisions since its
inception, with the most recent being the Uruguay Round
Agreements concluded at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1994.138 The
Uruguay Round also led to the creation of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") in 1995 as a system to deal not only with
issues regarding trade in goods as covered by GATT, but also with
those involving trade in services and intellectual property.' 0 9
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS") was also negotiated at the Uruguay Round."10
TRIPS has the ultimate goal of ensuring that intellectual property
protection will contribute to technical innovation and technology
transfer, and that the economic and social welfare of member States
will be enhanced as producers and users benefit from that

104. WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties: General Information,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited September 9, 2005).
105. Id.
106. Id.
Organization?,
Trade
World
the
is
What
WTO,
107.
(last
visited
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/factl_e.htm
September 9, 2005).
108. Id.
109. Id.
and
Protection
Protection:
Intellectual
110. WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/agrm7_e.htm
September 9, 2005).

Enforcement,
(last
visited
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protection.111 Underlying its framework are the basic principles that
national treatment and most favored nation ("MFN") status are
required among member States as a deterrent to discrimination
against foreign nationals." 2
TRIPS incorporates the Berne
Convention, as administered by WIPO, as the starting point for
determining what treaty obligations are required to meet these
goals.' 13
In 1996, the WTO and WIPO entered into a cooperation
agreement with the aim of establishing a mutually supportive
relationship for the administration of copyright protections among
nations.' 14 It is under this framework of trade agreements, treaties,
and cooperative arrangements that the dispute between the European
Communities and the United States over § 110(5) was brought before
a WTO Dispute Panel.
V. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PANEL REPORT

In response to a complaint filed against the United States by the
European Communities on behalf of the Irish Music Rights
Organization, 115 a WTO Dispute Panel ruled in 2000 that § 110(5)(B)
of the U.S. Copyright Act violates Articles 9 and 13116 of the TRIPS
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties: General Information,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited September 9, 2005).
115. The European Communities and their member states held consultations
with the United States on March 2, 1999 on TRIPS regarding § 110(5) as amended
by the FMLA. See TRIPS Agreement, infra note 117. After failing to reach an
agreement, the European Communities requested that a dispute resolution panel be
established under Article 6 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Article 64.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement. The requested panel met with the parties on November 8-9, 1999 and
December 7, 1999. It also met with third parties on November 9, 1999. On
December 22, 1999, WIPO responded to a request by the Panel for factual
information on the provisions of the Paris Act of 1971 of the Berne Convention, as
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 9.1. The parties provided
additional comments by letter on January 12, 2000. The Panel submitted its
interim report to the parties on April 14, 2000 and its final report on May 5, 2000.
Panel Report, supra note 1.
116. "Articles 9-13 of Section 1, Part II of the TRIPS Agreement entitled
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provisions of the WTO/GATT Agreement." 7 The Panel found that §
110(5)(B) proved to be too broad an exception to the public
performance right in musical compositions as guaranteed under
Article 9.1"8 of TRIPS. 1 9 However, it rejected arguments made by
the European Communities that § 110(5)(A) similarly violated
TRIPS; the Panel found that its scope was sufficiently narrow to
grant an exemption because it did not unreasonably prejudice the
The Panel concluded by
rights of copyright holders. 20
recommending that the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO request

'Copyright and Related Rights' deal with the substantive standards of copyright
protection." Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.17.
117. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The E.C. argued that §§ 110(5)(A)-(B)
violated not only the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement
(particularly Article 9.1), but also Articles 1l(l)(ii) and 1 lbis(l)(iii) of the Berne
Convention of 1971; as such, these sections could not be allowed under any
implied or express exception or limitation under either agreement. Panel Report,
supra note 1, at
3.1. It argued that the measures "cause prejudice to the
legitimate rights of copyright owners, thus nullifying and impairing the rights of
the European Communities." Id. The United States countered that the exemptions
fell within the allowance by the Berne Convention for minor limitations on the
exclusive rights of copyright owners, and thus satisfied the standard set forth in
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 3.3. The
Panel placed the burden of proof on the E.C. to establish a prima facie violation of
the basic rights provided by the TRIPS copyright provisions. Panel Report, supra
note 1, at 6.16. Once established, the burden then transferred to the United States
to show what exceptions or limitations should be found applicable and whether the
conditions set forth in these exceptions or limitations were satisfied. Id.
118. Article 9.1 requires WTO members to comply with Articles 1-21 of the
Berne Convention of 1971. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 117, at 1201. The only
provision that does not apply is the Article 6bis provision on moral rights. Id.
119. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7.1. The TRIPS Agreement requires all
WTO members to guarantee this right to copyright owners. Limitations and
exceptions to such exclusive rights are confined "to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 117, at 1201.
120. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.271. In its argument before the WTO,
the United States argued that the enactment of 11 0(5)(B) further narrowed the
scope of 110(5)(A) to works other than "non-dramatic musical works." Panel
Report, supra note 1, at 2.7.
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into conformity with its
that the United States bring § 110(5)(B)
12 1
Agreement.
TRIPS
the
under
obligations
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement adopts the copyright
protections afforded under the first twenty-one Articles of the Berne
Convention, except for those provisions contained in Article 6bis
regarding moral rights. 122 Regardless of whether signatories to
TRIPS are also members of the Berne Convention, they must comply
with Articles 1-21.123 Article 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention
protects authors' exclusive right to authorize "any communication to
the public of the performance of their works," namely dramatic,
dramatic-musical, and musical works.' 24 Regarding broadcasting
rights, Article l lbis(1) of the Berne Convention allows authors of
literary and artistic works 125 the exclusive right to authorize public
performances of those works.126 Article 1Ibis states:
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy
the exclusive right of authorizing:
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the
communication thereof to the public by any other
means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or
images;
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by
rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when this
communication is made by an organization other than
the original one;
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any
other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs,

121. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7.1.
122. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 117, at 1201.
123. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], WIPO Study on
Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital
Environment, SCCR/9/7, April 5, 2003 [hereinafter WIPO Study].
124. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
1I(1)(ii), Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, K.A.V. 2245 [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
125. Article 2 of the Berne Convention includes dramatic and dramaticmusical works within the definition of "literary and artistic works." Berne
Convention, supra note 129, art. 2(1).
126. Id. at art. lIbis(1).

634

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

25-2

sounds or images, the broadcast of the work.'27
In addition to the protections afforded by the Berne Convention,
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member States to create
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights so long as they are
confined to "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder."' 28 The primary issue
disputed in this case was whether the § 110(5) exemptions were
allowed under the "minor exceptions" doctrine of the Berne
Convention, 129 and, if so, whether they satisfied the three-step test
provided under Article 13.130
A. Applicability of the Minor Exceptions Doctrine
Rather than include a specific provision in the text of the Berne
Convention that would allow nations to preserve pre-existing
legislative exceptions to exclusive rights, the drafters of the
Convention chose to include a statement in the General Report
allowing nations to create so-called "minor exceptions" to the overall
rule. 13 1 Their fear was that if its text expressly allowed them to do
so, nations that had not previously recognized such exceptions would
incorporate them into their national laws before signing the Berne
Convention.' 32 The drafters intended that any exceptions to granted
rights would be of minimal significance to authors, and thus
127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 117, at 1201.
See infra Part V.A. and accompanying notes.
See infra Part V.B. and accompanying notes.
WIPO Study, supra note 123, at 34. The Panel chose to refer to the

doctrine as "minor exceptions" rather than "minor reservations," as the General
Report calls them, to avoid confusion arising from meaning of the word
"reservation" under Articles 19-23 of Section 2 of the Vienna Convention, which
deals specifically with "Reservations." Section 110 Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.49.

Additionally, it sought clarity due to requirements placed on Beme

Convention and TRIPS members seeking to make certain "reservations." See id.
This paper will also refer to both terms as the "minor exceptions" doctrine for
purposes of clarity. See WIPO Study, supra note 123, at 34-37 for a historical
analysis of the development of the minor exceptions doctrine.
132. WIPO Study, supra note 123, at 34.
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determined that a de minimus standard was applicable.' 33 Thus, the
minor exceptions doctrine became part of the "context" of the Berne
Convention 4for purposes of interpreting certain Articles, including 11
3
and 11 bis.1
The WTO Panel determined that the context of Articles 1l(1)(ii)
and 1lbis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention allows for certain minor
exceptions to exclusive rights granted under those articles, and that
the minor exceptions doctrine has been incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement under Article 9.1 for the purposes of allowing de
minimus uses.1 35 It inferred that, because Article 9.1 did not
expressly exclude the inclusion of the minor exceptions doctrine
within the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the possibility of providing
minor exceptions was incorporated into TRIPS as part of the "entire
acquis," or "context," of Articles 11 and 1Ibis of the Berne
Convention.136 It further held that Article 13 of TRIPS could be used
to define and articulate the minor exceptions doctrine; thus, any such
exceptions to rights afforded under the Berne Convention as
incorporated into TRIPS would have to meet the three-step test of
Article 13.131

133. Id. at 36. The WIPO Study contends this is supported by the fact that
both the Brussels and Stockholm Conferences rejected the inclusion of a specific
minor exceptions provision in the Berne Convention. Id.
134. Id.
135. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.92.
136. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.63. Regarding the limitation of the
minor exceptions doctrine to de minimus uses, the WIPO Study questioned whether
the WTO Panel correctly applied the three-step test under Article 13 as part of that
doctrine. WIPO Study, supra note 123, at 53. The Study argued that, while the
doctrine is not precise, it would certainly be possible that exceptions going beyond
a de minimus standard could still satisfy Article 13. Id. For example, certain
exceptions going beyond a de minimus level that are of a non-economic nature
would satisfy the second requirement; exceptions granting remuneration satisfy the
third requirement. Id. at 53-54. These minor exceptions would be allowed under
Article 13, thereby effectively making such de minimus uses a subset of that
Article. Id. While the business exemption failed to satisfy the three-part test, the
WIPO study contended that the Panel interpreted Article 13 too broadly. Id. at 54.
137. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.81-.82. The Panel noted that although
Article 1 bis(2) of the Berne Convention allows members to substitute various
forms of equitable remuneration, such as a compulsory license, for existing rights
granted under I Ibis(]), that provision was irrelevant since § 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act provided for no such right. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.95.
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B. Application ofArticle 13 to § 110(5)
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes a three-step test
regarding limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights: they (1)
must be confined to certain special cases, (2) cannot conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work, and (3) cannot unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 138 These
conditions are to be applied on a cumulative basis; if any one step is
not met, the exemption in question will fail the test and be found to
violate the TRIPS Agreement. 139 For each step, the Panel analyzed
the business exemption and the homestyle exemption separately. It
began its analysis with the requirement that exceptions should be
confined to certain special cases.
1. Certain Special Cases
The condition that an exception must be limited to certain special
cases requires that the exception is clearly defined and narrow in its
scope and reach. 140 In its analysis, the Panel examined whether
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of § 110(5) were clearly restricted to
"certain special cases," and whether their scope was sufficiently
narrow in reach regarding what percentage of establishments fell
See WIPO Study, supra note 123, at 50 for further discussion of the interrelation of
the minor exceptions doctrine and other Berne Convention and TRIPS provisions.
138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 117, at 1201.
139. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.97.
140. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.112. The Panel defined "certain" to
require that legislative exceptions or limitations must be clearly defined. Panel
Report, supra note 1, at
6.108. The Panel reasoned that "there is no need to
identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could
apply, provided that the scope of the exception is known and particularized. This
guarantees a sufficient degree of legal certainty." Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.108. While stated public policy objectives may be used for ascertaining its scope,
a limitation or exception may still fulfill this condition regardless of the law's
legitimacy. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.112. "Special" requires that an
exception limitation "should be narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative
sense." Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.109. Finally, "case" was termed to
include descriptions of "beneficiaries of the exceptions, equipment used, types of
works or by other factors." Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.110. For arguments
by the United States and the European Communities on the meaning of this first
condition, see Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7 6.102-.106.
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within their confines.' 4 ' The Panel found it helpful to look at
whether any inferences could be drawn from statements by U.S.
legislators regarding the intended reach of the exemptions. 142 The
Panel began its analysis by reviewing subparagraph (B): the
"business exemption."
a) The Business Exemption
While the United States claimed that the policy objective behind
the business exemption was to foster small businesses and prevent
abusive tactics by performing rights organizations, 143 the European
Communities contended that the exemption's scope was too broad
44
given the potentially large number of benefited establishments.'
Finding it to be sufficiently specific in terms of permissible area,
size, and type of equipment, the Panel focused on the issue of
whether the exception could be considered a "special" case or
whether it was the de facto rule.' 45 The Panel referred to the
46
following studies in its factual inquiry: 1
1. The Congressional Research Service ("CRS") prepared a
study in November, 1995 for the Senate Judiciary Committee
that found 65.2% of eating establishments and 71.8% of
drinking establishments were smaller than 3,500 square feet in
size, and 27% of retail establishments were smaller than 1,500
square feet in size. 147

141. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.113.
142. Id.
143. The Panel Report generally refers to performing rights organizations as
collective management organizations, or CMOs, which it defines to have the same
meaning. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 2.17. For consistency within this
paper and to follow general U.S. custom, I will refer to both terms as "performing
rights organizations."
144. Panel Report, supranote 1, at 6.116.
145. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.117.
146. Although there was some disagreement between the parties as to the
scope of these studies, the Panel determined it should include all potential users,
even if some establishments might be excluded for various reasons, because the
potential impact on the use of other substitutable sources of music was relevant.
Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.127.
147. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.118. The United States confirmed these
figures for eating and drinking establishments. Because the establishment size
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2. ASCAP requested Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ("D&B") to update
CRS data after the 1998 Amendment. D&B found that 70%
of eating establishments and 73% of drinking establishments
were smaller than 3,750 square feet, and 45% of retail
48
establishments were smaller than 2,000 square feet in size.1
3. The National Restaurant Association ("NRA") found 36% of
table service restaurants with sit-down waiter service, and
95% of quick service restaurants, were smaller than 3,750
149
square feet in size.
Concluding from these studies that the statute exempted a
substantial majority of eating and drinking establishments and almost
half of all retail establishments, the Panel "fail[ed] to see how a law
that exempts a major part of the users that were specifically intended
to be covered by the provisions of Article 1lbis(1)(iii) could be
considered as a special case in the sense of the first condition of
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.' 150 Based on this comment, it
seems that, had the statute required physical dimensions such that a
substantially lower percentage of establishments would qualify for
the exemption, the Panel may have found in favor of the U.S.
Ultimately, however, it found the business exemption did not qualify
as a "certain special case" within the meaning of Article 13.151
Next, the Panel reviewed whether the homestyle exemption of
subparagraph (A) fulfilled the "certain special cases" requirement.

limits in subparagraph (B) are greater than those in the CRS study (3,750 and 2,000
square feet, respectively), the Panel assumed these percentages would be higher in
reality. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.120.
148. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.117. D&B claimed to use the same
methodology in its 1999 study as was used to prepare the 1995 CRS report. The
Panel commented, however, that, although the 1999 study's methodology was
vague, it was largely consistent with the 1995 CRS study. Panel Report, supra note
1, at 6.124. The EC noted these figures left out service providers such as hotels,
financial services outlets, estate property brokers, and other types of exempted
establishments. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 2.12 n. 17.
149. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.121. Due to a lack of information on
NRA membership, the Panel noted it could not reconcile the NRA and CRS
figures. Instead, it simply stated the NRA figures did not appear to contradict the
CRS estimates. Id.
150. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
151. Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.13 1.
6.133.
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b) The Homestyle Exemption
By reviewing the Aiken decision 52 and
following the homestyle exemption's enactment
of 1976, the Panel compiled a list of factors
courts to determine whether the exemption
particular establishment, including:

other case history
in the Copyright Act
commonly used by
would apply to a

(i) [the] physical size of an establishment in terms of
square footage (in comparison to the size of the Aiken
restaurant); (ii) extent to which the receiving
apparatus was to be considered as one commonly used
in private homes; (iii) distance between the receiver
and the speakers; (iv) number of speakers; (v) whether
the speakers were free-standing or built into the
ceiling; (vi) whether, depending on its revenue, the
establishment was of a type that would normally
subscribe to a background music service; (vii) noise
level of the areas within the establishment where the
transmissions were made audible or visible; and (viii)
53
configuration of the installation.'
The Panel also reviewed the legislative history behind the
homestyle exemption. It agreed with the United States' argument
that the policy behind the homestyle exemption was to protect small
"mom and pop" businesses that "play an important role in the
American social fabric;" Congress meant to create an exception that

was narrow in scope.' 54
The European Communities contended that the statutory
language was too ambiguous because "the expression 'a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes' is in
itself imprecise and a 'moving target' due to technological
development."' 155 The United States countered that the language of
the 1998 amendment was essentially the same as that found in the
152. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
153. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.139. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.140-. 141 for arguments by both parties regarding these factors.
154. Panel Report, supra note 1, at TT 6.156-.157.
155. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.137.
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1976 Copyright Act, and that American courts had found this
language to be sufficiently clear and narrow for a reasonable and
consistent application of the exception.15 6 The application of various
different ways
factors by judges interpreting the statute in slightly
57
1
system.
law
common
a
of
result
the
merely
was
The European Communities further argued that what constitutes
"homestyle equipment" would have different meanings in various
countries, would differ according to consumer demands of those
countries, and would evolve because of technological
developments. 58 Thus, there could be no consistent application
59
across international boundaries without a more precise description.
The Panel rejected the European Communities' arguments by
referring to the meaning of the term "certain special case," which
connotes a "known and particularized, but not explicitly identified"
meaning."' While technology will change over time, it explained,
Article 13 does not require a detailed specification of allowable
equipment and it would be unnecessary to speculate on future
The Panel thus found that the homestyle
advancements. 16 1
exemption's language was sufficiently clear regarding what types of
62
equipment it covered. 1
Furthermore, the CRS study showed that, "from a quantitative
perspective, the reach of subparagraph (A) in respect of potential
users is limited to a comparably small percentage of all eating,
drinking and retail establishments in the United States."' 163 In
156. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.136.
157. Id.

158. Panel Report, supranote 1,at 6.145.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.

162. Id.
163. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.143. The Panel again referred to the
1995 CRS study, which found that 16% of all U.S. eating establishments, 13.5% of
all U.S. drinking establishments, and 18% of all U.S. retail establishments were the
same size or smaller than the Aiken restaurant (1,055 square feet), and so would
benefit from the homestyle exemption. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.142; see
also supra note 149 and accompanying text. The United States confirmed these
figures regarding eating and drinking establishments. Panel Report, supra note 1,
at 6.142; U.S. Reply to Question 9(a) by the Panel to the United States and Letter
from the NRA of Nov. 18, 1999, confidential exhibit U.S.-18.
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response to the European Communities' concern that the judiciary
was moving towards a broader interpretation of the statute, the Panel
acknowledged that while it was possible such expansion of the scope
of the homestyle exemption might foreseeably occur, there was no
need to decide the issue "[g]iven the sufficiently consistent and
narrow application practice of the homestyle exemption" by U.S.
courts since 1976.164
Regarding musical works covered under the homestyle
exemption, the Panel found that the enactment of subparagraph (B)
narrowed the homestyle exemption's scope to non-dramatic works
and thus resulted in the practical consequence that virtually all music
played on radio and television would fall under subparagraph (B), not
65
subparagraph (A). 1
The Panel also acknowledged that the homestyle exemption does
not distinguish between analog and digital transmissions, but felt it
was not presented with sufficient evidence to show the exemption
had been applied to Internet transmissions.1 66 Therefore, any such
67
potential uses would not immediately affect its conclusion.'
Taking all these factors into account, the Panel found that the
requirement of Article
homestyle exemption complied with the first 68
'1
13 that it be limited to "certain special cases."
Because subparagraph (B) did not comply with the first condition
of Article 13, the Panel found it in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement.169 For purposes of a thorough resolution of the dispute,
however, the Panel examined the business exemption under other
170
Article 13 criteria.
2. Does Not Conflict With a Normal Exploitation of the Work
The Panel first analyzed the second Article 13 requirement by

164. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.144.
165. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.146-.148.
166. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.149-.153.
167. See id.
168. Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.159.

169. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.160.
170. Id.
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determining what constitutes "normal exploitation" of a "work".17 1 It
defined "normal" as "constituting or conforming to a type or
standard; regular, usual, typical, ordinary, conventional . . 172
"Exploitation" was defined as "the activity by which copyright
owners employ the exclusive rights conferred on them to extract
economic value from their rights to those works."' 173 A "work" under
Article 13 includes "all the exclusive rights relating to it.' 174 Thus,
the Panel adopted an interpretation focusing on a literal meaning of
the language as applied to common industry custom and standards.
It next established guidelines for how a particular use may be
designated as a "normal exploitation of the exclusive rights provided
under Articles 1lbis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention
(197 1)."571 It accepted the United States' argument that an economic
"market displacement" analysis that looks at "whether there are areas
of the market in which the copyright owner would ordinarily expect
to exploit the work, but which are not available for exploitation
because of [the § 110(5)] exemption" should be applied.1 76 Under
this empirical test, "uses from which an owner would not ordinarily
expect to receive compensation
are not part of the normal
77
exploitation [of the work]."'
According to the Panel's reasoning, not every use under an
exception or limitation of a work involving commercial gain would

171. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.163. For a discussion of each party's
arguments regarding what constitutes a "normal exploitation of a work," see Panel
Report, supra note 1, at 77 6.168-.169.
172. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.166 (citation omitted).
173. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.165.
174. Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.171.

175. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.176.
176. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.177.
177. Id. Concerning the "conforming to a type or standard" requirement, the
Panel looked to the "Swedish/BIRPI Study Group" for guidance. Panel Report,
supra note 1, at
6.179 (citation omitted). Representatives of the Swedish
government and the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property comprised a group organized to study the issue prior to the 1967 Revision
Conference in Stockholm. Id. The Group said that, in order to measure the level of
normal exploitation at issue, those forms of exploitation that could potentially gain
economic or practical importance should be taken into account in addition to other
currently significant forms of exploitation. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.179-.181.
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necessarily conflict with the normal exploitation of that work:
[A]n exception or limitation to an exclusive right in
domestic legislation rises to the level of a conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work ...

if uses, that in

principle are covered by that right but exempted under
the exception or limitation, enter into economic
competition with the ways that right holders normally
extract economic value from that right to the work
them of
(i.e., the copyright) and thereby deprive
78
gains.'
commercial
tangible
or
significant
Thus, the Panel determined that the normal exploitation of a work
is affected by those who, under an exception or limitation, use it
without proper authorization, as well as by those who decide to use
the work once that use becomes "free of charge" because of the
exception or limitation.' 79 Again, the Panel first addressed the
business exemption of subparagraph (B).
a) The Business Exemption
The United States gave three arguments for why the business
exemption does not conflict with the normal exploitation of
copyrighted works. First, performing rights societies would have a
considerably difficult time administering licenses to the multitude of
small eating, drinking, and retail establishments.' 80 Because this
market was never significantly exploited by performing rights
societies, Congress simply codified the status quo of their historical
licensing practices.' 8' Second, many of the establishments that
178. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.183.
179. Panel Report, supra note 1, at T 6.186. The Panel decided to limit itself to
those commercial and technological conditions existing at the time of its report
(2000) and in the near future in assessing whether the § 110(5) exemption
conflicted with a normal exploitation in the U.S. market. See Panel Report, supra
note 1, at TT 6.187-.189.
180. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.190.
181. Id. The NRA estimated that 16% of table service restaurants and 5% of
fast food restaurants, or an average of 10.5% of restaurants, were licensed by
performing rights organizations at the time the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted.
Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.193; see also supra note 149 and accompanying

644

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

25-2

would qualify under the business exemption were already exempted
under the old homestyle exemption; therefore, copyright owners of
non-dramatic musical works would not expect to receive fees from
those small establishments before the FMLA was passed.' 82 Third,
had the business exemption never been enacted, many eligible
establishments would nevertheless have been exempted under a
similar group licensing agreement between the National Licensed
Beverage Association ("NLBA"), ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC; as
such, rights holders would not have expected to obtain fees from
183
these establishments before the 1998 Amendment was passed.
Furthermore, a relatively small number of establishments would be
exempted under subparagraph (B) that were not previously exempted
under the homestyle exemption or the NLBA Agreement.1 84 The
85
Panel rejected this last argument as not pertinent to the dispute.'
The European Communities countered the United States'
practical argument with a more legalistic one: "Administrative
difficulties in licensing a great number of small establishments do not
excuse the very absence of the right, because there can be
186
enforcement of only such rights as are recognized by law."
Furthermore, it argued that performing rights organizations in the EC
had been successful in licensing large numbers of small
establishments, whereas U.S. organizations had failed to do so
pressure on them to develop methods of
because there was no legal
87
licensing enforcement. 1
Although the Panel agreed with the United States that there was a
relatively low proportion of restaurants licensed by performing rights
organizations, whether these establishments were licensed was not
text. The United States estimated, based on ASCAP data, that ASCAP licensed no
more than 19% of restaurants in 1997. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.194. The
United States also estimated that 74% of all restaurants play some kind of music for
their customers. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.195.
182. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.190.
6.204 for a discussion on
183. Id. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at
similarities and differences between subparagraph (B) and the NLBA agreement.
The NLBA was one of the initial proponents behind the 1998 amendment to §
110(5).
184. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
185. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
186. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
187. Id.

6.190.
6.205.
6.191.
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fully indicative of the "normal exploitation" of their exclusive right
to do so. 188 For the establishments that did not fall under the
homestyle exemption, it found that the fact that many were licensed
did not alter the exclusive rights of owners of copyrighted works and
1 89
should not affect those rights holders' expectation of remuneration.
To hold otherwise would liken "normal exploitation" with existing
"normal remuneration" practices, with the result that the current state
of rights exploitation would be "frozen."' 9 ° It would therefore be
erroneous to conclude that licensing practices of performing rights
of
organizations at a given time should set the minimum standard
19
national legislative protection under the TRIPS Agreement. '
The Panel found that a substantial majority of eating and drinking
establishments and almost half of all retail establishments were
eligible for the business exemption, thus constituting a major
potential source of royalty income to rights holders for exploitation
of their works under Articles 1 lbis(1)(iii) and 1 l(1)(ii) of the Berne
Convention of 1971.192 These rights holders would normally expect
to have the ability to authorize and receive compensation for the
performance of their works in many of the establishments covered by
the exemption.' 93 The Panel felt that an exemption of such broad
scope as subparagraph (B) would hinder this expectation and
therefore violated Article 13 because it conflicted with the normal
194
exploitation requirement.
b) The Homestyle Exemption
In reviewing the homestyle exemption, the Panel again applied
the Article 13 condition that an exemption should not conflict with
that
Congress
explained
the normal exploitation of a work. It

6.196. The fact that the 1998
188. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
Amendment did not substantially affect the licensing practices of performing rights
organizations of those establishments eligible under the homestyle exemption was

not found to be relevant. Id.
189. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
190. Id.

6.198.

191. Id.

192. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
193. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
194. Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.206.
6.2 10.
6.211.
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intended to define the borderline between situations clearly outside
the scope of copyright laws (e.g., listening to the radio at home), and
those situations where someone creates a new public performance of
music broadcast over the air.' 95 This line was established at the point
where an establishment merely turns on an ordinary receiver
96
although members of the public may also hear the transmission.'
The original homestyle exemption under the 1976 Act was
limited to "establishments not . . . large enough to justify a
subscription to a commercial background music service," and "would
merely codify the licensing practices already in effect."' 9 7 Using
legislative history behind the exemption, the United States argued
that rights holders did not have an expectation of remuneration for
the use of their works from small establishments prior to the statute's
enactment because owners of those establishments were unlikely to
have obtained licenses anyway. As such, there was no conflict with
98
the normal exploitation of their works after the statute's passage.'
The United States further argued that rights holders had no
reasonable expectation to exploit "dramatic" musical works
small establishments because no licensing mechanism
performed in 99
was in place.'
Accepting the United States' arguments as sound, the Panel found
the homestyle exemption did not violate the normal exploitation of
works within the meaning of Article 13.200 "[W]e fail to see how the
homestyle exemption, as limited to works other than nondramatic
musical works in its revised form, could acquire economic or
practical importance of any considerable dimension for the right
195. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.214. The Panel referred to House
6.212Report No. 94-1576 in making its finding. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
.213; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1576 (1976).
196. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.214.
197. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.212. The Panel noted that the number
of such establishments intended to fall within the homestyle exemption was
relatively small according to the 1995 CRS study. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.215. It found that 16% of all eating establishments, 13.5% of drinking
establishments, and 18% of retail establishments were as big as or smaller than the
Aiken restaurant (1,055 square feet of total space). Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.215 n.197.
198. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.212.
199. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.216.
200. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.219.
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holders of musical works.",20 1 It appears the Panel at least partially
based its ruling on the further limitation of the homestyle exemption
to works other than non-dramatic musical works. Should Congress
choose to repeal the business exemption without altering the
homestyle exemption, it remains unclear whether the latter will revert
back to its original application and once again include non-dramatic
musical works. If it does, the issue of whether the homestyle
exemption satisfies Article 13 will remain unresolved because of the
limited nature of the Panel's ruling.
3. Does Not Unreasonably Prejudice the Legitimate Interests of
the Rights Holder
The third condition of Article 13 requires that an exception or
limitation should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the rights holder.20 2 The United States argued that the test for this
condition should focus on whether the economic impact caused by §
110(5) exemptions would unreasonably prejudice copyright
holders.20 3 In applying a looser standard, the European Communities
asserted that the test should instead be based on whether the
exemptions could potentially prejudice rights holders regardless of
any actual financial losses suffered. 20 4 The Panel adopted neither
view outright and determined that "prejudice to the legitimate
interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an
to cause an
exception or limitation causes or has the potential
20 5
owner."
copyright
the
to
income
of
loss
unreasonable

201. Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.218 (emphasis added).

202. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 117, at 1201.
203. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.220.
204. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.221.
205. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.229. In reaching this interpretation, the
Panel first sought to define what "interests" are at stake and which attributes make
those interests "legitimate." It then interpreted the term "prejudice" and determined
at what level it becomes "unreasonable." See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 77
6.222-.229. The term "interest" is defined by the Panel to "encompass a legal right
or title to a property or to use or benefit of a property (including intellectual
property)," and "may also refer to a concern about a potential detriment or
advantage, and more generally to something that is of some importance to a natural
6.223. The term is "not
or legal person." Panel Report, supra note 1, at
necessarily limited to actual or potential economic advantage or detriment." Id.
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a) The Business Exemption
The Panel began its analysis with the business exemption of
subparagraph (B) by examining whether any actual or potential
prejudice caused by the exemptions had reached an unreasonable
level.
Both parties accepted the European Communities' figures that
73% of all drinking establishments, 70% of all eating establishments,
and 45% of all retail establishments were covered by the business
exemption. 20 6 While the European Communities argued that this was
enough to show that the exemption had become the rule rather than
the exception, the United States used these figures as a starting point
from which to further reduce the number of covered
establishments. 20 7
While conceding exact figures would be
impossible to calculate, the United States subtracted establishments
that:
(i) do not play music at all;
(ii) rely on music from some source other than radio
or TV (such as tapes, CDs, commercial background
music services, jukeboxes, or live music);
(iii) were not licensed prior to the passage of the 1998
amendment and which the [performing rights
organizations] would not be able to license anyway;
"Legitimate" refers to both lawfulness and legitimacy in regards to "calling for the
protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie
the protection of exclusive rights."
Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.224.
"Prejudice" suggests "damage, harm or injury." Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7
6.225. Finally, "not unreasonable" is somewhat stricter than the term "reasonable,"
which means "proportionate," "within the limits of reason, not greatly less or more
than might be thought likely or appropriate," or "of a fair, average or considerable
amount or size." Id. Agreeing there was no question as to the "legitimacy" of a
rights holder's interest in exploiting a work for economic gain, the parties chose to
focus on the "prejudice" element. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.226. The
Panel further determined that assessment of prejudice to rights holders by § 110(5)
was not limited to rights holders from the European Communities. Panel Report,
supra note 1, at T 6.235. For the Panel's discussion on who may enforce legitimate
interests of rights holders of various WTO members within the framework of the
WTO dispute settlement system, see Panel Report, supra note 1, at
6.230-.235.
206. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.237.
207. Panel Report, supra note 1, at TT 6.237-.238.
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(iv) would take advantage of the NLBA agreement,
whose terms are practically identical to subparagraph
(B), if the statutory exemption were not available; and
(v) would prefer to simply turn off the music rather
than pay the fees demanded by the [performing rights
organizations] .28
The Panel considered each of these factors in its analysis of the
business exemption; however, it noted that the United States bore the
burden of proving the statute met the requirements of Article 13.209
It also addressed these factors presented by the United States as
comprising categories representing establishments that would choose
to adopt "no music or music from another source" rather than pay
license fees, and those "establishments not licensed before the 1998
The Panel thus
Amendment and the NLBA Agreement., 210
considered the factors in a slightly different order than that given by
the United States' submission.
The first, second, and fifth factors given by the United States
addressed an establishment's choice of opting to have no music
played or to choose another source of music rather than pay licensing
fees. The Panel concluded that "[t]he fact that one source of music is
free of charge while another triggers copyright liability may have a
significant impact on which source of music the operators of
establishments choose, and on how much they are willing to pay for
protected music. '' 2 11 Not only would rights holders lose revenue
from users newly exempted under the business exemption, it is likely
they would lose pre-existing revenue streams from establishment
owners who do not choose to switch to recorded music or
2 12
commercial background music services.
The third factor concerned establishments that were unlicensed
prior to the 1998 Amendment and the NLBA Agreement. The
European Communities argued that figures presented by the United
States regarding licensing of establishments before the 1976 Act, the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.238.
Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.239.
See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.242.
Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.241.
Id.
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1995 CRS study regarding the pre-1998 Amendment period, and
those reported by ASCAP could not be relied on for accuracy
because past royalty collection practices were not representative of
the otherwise measurable losses suffered by current copyright
holders.21 3 The Panel was concerned that, if only actual losses were
accounted for, new exceptions might be enacted for newly introduced
exclusive rights that previously were not effectively or affordably
enforceable, or were not enforced because the rights holder had not
developed an adequate collective management system. 214 Thus, the
Panel took into account:
not only the actual loss of income from those
restaurants that were licensed by the performing rights
organizations at the time that the exemption [became]
effective, but also the loss of potential revenue from
other restaurants of similar size likely to play music
2 15
that were not licensed at that point.
Regarding the fourth factor, the Panel dismissed it as nondeterminative for the same reasons found in analyzing the second
condition of Article 13.216

Thus, the Panel cautioned against giving too much weight to the
U.S.'s factors, but also recognized the difficulty of quantifying the
economic value of potential prejudice. 217 After acknowledging that
potential revenues would be affected by any exemption and so should
be considered generally, the Panel turned to the actual figures given
by each party.
The United States estimated that the maximum annual loss
suffered by European Communities rights holders administered by
ASCAP would range from $294,113 to $586,332, and those
administered by BMI would amount to $122,000.218

In stark

contrast, the European Communities estimated the annual loss to all
213. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
214. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
215. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
216. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
217. Panel Report, supra note 1, at
218. Panel Report, supra note 1,
formula used by the United States.

6.245-.246.
6.247.
6.249.
6.250
6.251.
at
6.252. See id. for the calculations
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rights holders to be $53.65 million.219 Although the Panel showed
some frustration over the fact that neither party provided very
detailed or direct information in support of their estimates,22° it
nevertheless determined that, in light of the actual and potential
prejudice caused by the business exemption, the United States failed
to meet its burden of proof in showing the exemption did not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of rights holders as
required under Article 13.221

b) The Homestyle Exemption
Having found the business exemption to be in violation of the
third step of Article 13, the Panel turned to whether the homestyle
exemption of subparagraph (A) unreasonably prejudiced rights
holders' interests.
The United States contended that the homestyle exemption
targeted establishments that represented a small licensing market.222
Therefore, it would not represent a sufficiently significant source of
income for rights holders to justify imposing commercial licensing
requirements on them. 23 These establishments were the least likely
category of businesses to be aggressively sought after by performing
rights organizations for licensing. 224 Additionally, any applicable
219. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.253. See id. for the calculations
formula used by the European Communities. Note that their figures were for all
rights holders, not just those administered within the European Communities. This
is one explanation for the wide range separating the two estimates. Upon request
by the Panel for figures for European Communities members, the European
Communities only provided information from the Irish Music Rights Organisation
("IMRO"), which represented about 1% of the total European Communities
population. It then multiplied that number by one-hundred to reach its final figure.
The Panel did not find this calculation to be very meaningful nor useful for its
purposes. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.253 n.224.
220. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.260.
221. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.266. The DSU Arbitrators ultimately
favored the U.S. method of calculations using a "top-down" approach, although it
did not accept all of the adjustments and deductions proposed by the U.S. See
Award of the Arbitrators, supra note 5.
222. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.267.
223. Id.
224. Id. The Panel noted that the European Communities held the opposite
view, but did not further argue the matter because it felt the aggressiveness of
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license fees would be comparably quite low such that, in the absence
of any exception, there would be no real economic detriment to rights
holders if no licenses were sought or issued by performing rights
organizations.225 If license fees were sought, these businesses were
more likely to turn off their equipment because of the incidental
function of broadcasted works to their services rather than paying
relatively high license fees. 226 Finally, the United States noted that
the homestyle exemption's scope was greatly reduced when the 1998
Amendment's enactment limited its applicability to "dramatic"
2 27
musical works.

The European Communities pointed out that the judicial history
before the 1998 Amendment showed that significant economic
interests were at stake, and that, under Aiken, a large percentage of
establishments were covered under the homestyle exemption. 228 It
did not, however, address the impact on the number of exempted
establishments following the 1998 Amendment, which limited the
homestyle exemption's scope to "dramatic" musical works.
The Panel was unmoved by the European Communities'
argument, given that the 1998 Amendment limited the homestyle
exemption's applicability to "dramatic" works, especially because
there was insufficient evidence to show that rights holders of such
works had or would have attempted to license their broadcasts before
or after the 1998 Amendment's enactment. 229 It could not see how
broadcasts of "dramatic" works could "acquire such economic or
practical importance that [they] could cause unreasonable prejudice
230
to the legitimate interests of right holders.,
In further support of its opinion that the homestyle exemption's

performing rights organizations in seeking license fees from small establishments
was irrelevant to this particular issue. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.268 n.229.
225. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.267.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.268. The Panel cited to the 1995 CRS
study, which reported that 13.5%, 16%, and 18% of all U.S. drinking, eating, and
retail establishments, respectively, were covered by the exemption. Panel Report,
supra note 1, at 6.268 n.227.
229. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.270. The Panel noted that this was the

common understanding of the parties at dispute. Id.
230. Id.
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scope was sufficiently narrow to avoid prejudicing right holders'
interests, the Panel looked to the committee reports behind the 1976
Act. The Conference Report intended to exempt a small commercial
establishment "'which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a
practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music
Furthermore, the House Report noted that the
service.
exemption would impose liability where a proprietor installed a
"commercial sound system," or augmented a "standard home
receiving apparatus . . . into the equivalent of a commercial sound
232

system."
Finally, the Panel felt that both actual and potential losses were
relevant in determining the existence of prejudice. 233 However, it
was not persuaded that works covered by the homestyle exemption
had ever been, or ever would be, a significant source of income for
performing rights organizations, especially considering the limited
scope of the exemption under the 1998 Amendment. 34 Thus, the
Panel held that the homestyle exemption of subparagraph (A)
satisfied the third requirement of Article 13 that it should "not cause
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right
holder.

' 235

C. PanelReport Conclusion
The Panel concluded that the homestyle exemption of
subparagraph (A) of § 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act
complied with Article 13 requirements under the TRIPS Agreement,
as interpreted to define and articulate the minor exceptions doctrine
under the Berne Convention of 1971. As such, it did not violate
Articles 1lbis(1)(iii) and 1l(1)(ii) of the Beme Convention of 1971
as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1 of that
Agreement.236 Conversely, the Panel found that the business
231.
(1976)).
232.
(1976)).
233.
234.
235.
236.

Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.269 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733

Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.269 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476

Panel Report, supra note 1, at
Id.
Panel Report, supra note 1, at
Panel Report, supra note 1, at

6.271.
6.272.
7.1.
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exemption of subparagraph (B) failed to meet those requirements,
and recommended that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body request
the United States bring that provision into conformity with its
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 237 After arbitration to
determine the level of trade sanctions that would be imposed on the
United States if it failed to amend or repeal § 110(5)(B), the Dispute
Settlement Body set the amount owed by the United States to the
238
European Communities at approximately $1.1 million per year.
As of this writing, Congress has not yet made a decision as to
whether it shall continue to pay damages or amend its legislation to
conform to the TRIPS Agreement.239
VI. CRITIQUE
Congress has a number of solutions available to it in seeking to
comply with the WTO Dispute Panel's ruling. One obvious method
is to simply repeal the business exemption and keep the homestyle
exemption in place, thereby conforming to the Panel's
recommendations. In its arguments to the Panel, however, the United
States has potentially dealt a lethal blow to the original homestyle
exemption's scope. In its effort to save both exemptions from
international scrutiny, the United States significantly narrowed the
homestyle exemption from including both non-dramatic and dramatic
musical works to only include the latter, with the result that the
statute has very little practical applicability as the vast majority of
Without a
works broadcasted to customers are non-dramatic.
business exemption in place, Congress's intent to protect small
business owners from paying license fees will be severely
undermined. The Panel's decision is not binding on American
courts, and so the homestyle exemption's scope may simply be
interpreted to revert back to its pre-1998 meaning and include both
dramatic and non-dramatic musical works; however, this result is not
237. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7.1-.2.
238. Award of the Arbitrators, supra note 5. The Dispute Settlement Body
chose not to consider music broadcast through the Internet in its calculation.
Award of the Arbitrators, supra note 5, at 4.35.
239. WTO, Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB
Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute, United States - Section 110(5) of
the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS 160/24/Add. 10 (Sept. 15, 2005).
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certain.
Another simple remedy is to leave both exemptions untouched
and opt to pay damages indefinitely. However, the implication that
the United States is more interested in enforcing copyright
protections abroad than within its own borders could potentially send
a damaging message of hypocrisy to its trading partners. While the
approximately $1.1 million in annual damages is miniscule relative to
the federal budget, it only adds to the aura of arrogance perceived by
other nations that the United States thinks it can pay them rather than
comply with international treaties. The result is that these nations
may be much less willing to enforce the rights of U.S. copyright
holders within their own borders, and may be less cooperative when
it comes to honoring claims by American copyright plaintiffs, no
matter their validity.
Failure to amend the exemption would also result in inequitable
compensation between U.S. and European copyright holders.
European copyright holders whose works are being performed
alongside American works will generate more in performance
royalties than U.S. holders for no other reason than a difference in
citizenship. Additionally, while the initial damages set by the WTO
are not great, they may be significantly increased by the WTO if
Congress refuses to honor its request for conformity with
international obligations. More WTO member States may also seek
similar compensation, thus adding to the annual payout by the United
States.
Another option available to Congress is to repeal § 110(5) in its
entirety and create a completely new exemption that both protects
small businesses and satisfies Article 13. In 1996, Senator Hank
Brown made one such proposal with Senate Bill 1628, which
exempted any:
(5) communication within a commercial establishment
of a transmission embodying a performance or display
of a work by the reception of a broadcast, cable,
satellite, or other transmission, if communicated (A) in an area within the establishment where a
transmission is intended to be received by the general
public that is smaller than 5,000 square feet;
(B) within an establishment whose gross annual
income does not exceed 20 percent of the gross annual
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income of a small business under the applicable
Standard Industrial Code as defined by the Small
Business Administration;
(C) by means of 10 or fewer loudspeakers, not
including speakers in audiovisual devices; or
(D) by means of speakers in audiovisual devices only,
if no direct charge is made to see or hear the
transmission, the reception of the transmission is
authorized, and the transmission or retransmission is
beyond the
not further transmitted to the public
41
establishment.1
retail
the
of
premises
While it might be a good starting point, Senator Brown's
proposal would have to be modified in light of the Panel's rulings.
The Panel found that the business exemption's size restriction of
2,000 to 3,750 square feet included too great a percentage of
establishments, so this number would have to be reduced somewhat
so that a smaller percentage of establishments would be covered.2 4 '
The number of speakers allowed would have to be reduced as well.
Most home stereo systems do not have more than two speakers, six if
a typical "surround sound" system is used. To make it truly a
"homestyle" exemption, the language would have to allow for fewer
speakers than ten. An alternative to specifying a specific number of
speakers that may be used is to place a limit on the maximum
average sound decibel level that a stereo might produce. This limits
what types of equipment that may be used to those of a noncommercial type. Larger establishments would need a system that is
capable of producing louder broadcasts and so would fall outside the
exemption's coverage. It would also avoid the somewhat arbitrary
determination of how many speakers may be used, while also
accounting for technological improvements in home stereo
equipment.
The most important aspect of Senator Brown's proposal,
however, is that it includes a financial means requirement. Congress
refused to adopt such a condition, but this may be an excellent way of
limiting the exemption's applicability. The original homestyle

240. S. 1628, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996).
241. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 6.120.

Fall 2005

Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act

exemption was intended to protect establishments that were so small
they could not afford to pay license fees. Basing coverage on a
predetermined level or percentage of gross annual income creates a
bright-line rule that is much easier to follow and would meet Article
13's requirements because of its greatly limited scope of application.
Additionally, Congress has the option to simply repeal the
exemption in its entirety and wash its hands of the long-debated
It is unlikely that ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, or other
matter.
organizations would enforce licensing
performing rights
requirements on small businesses. Very little income is generated
from the businesses that Congress intended to protect with the
homestyle exemption. Rather than spend the immense time and
resources necessary to collect a relatively miniscule amount of
money in royalties from small business owners, performing rights
organizations are more likely to simply ignore them completely. If
the rights societies were to seek royalties on a grand scale, small
business owners could easily band together and engage in collective
bargaining to reach some private agreement that would allow for a
manageable licensing scheme for proprietors that would still meet
copyright requirements. Pressures of practicality and economics, not
more regulation, would thus solve the problem.
Finally, there is the question of whether any such exemption as §
110(5) should exist at all. Should there be an exception to the
exclusive right to license performances of a copyright work merely
because small business owners do not want (or have the ability) to
pay license fees, and performing rights organizations have not found
or sought a practical and effective way to enforce their collection?
To restaurant businesses, for example, playing music in their
establishments is something akin to an ordinary expense incurred
when buying fine tablecloths and expensive artwork. While not
essential to serving food, these greatly enhance the dining experience
and thus attract customers and increase revenues. Why should
business owners be allowed to avoid paying an expense that greatly
increases customer satisfaction simply because it is something that is
an artistic expression by nature rather than something tangible?
The European Communities argued that just because it is
impractical to enforce a right does not mean that the right should be
taken away. This is a compelling argument that the WTO Panel
addressed with seeming contradiction. It accepted the argument
when it came to the business exemption because there was such a
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large economic impact because of tremendously wide coverage of the
exemption. However, it did not accept the argument when applying
it to small businesses covered by the homestyle exemption. This
author agrees with the European Communities' argument, but accepts
that there is a strong and unique American tradition of seeking to
protect small "mom and pop" shops. This tradition will likely
continue in the realm of copyright law in one form or another for
years to come.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress must soon decide whether to amend or repeal the
business exemption in § 110(5)(B), or to keep the provision and pay
out damages, thus resulting in an unfavorable inequity of copyright
enforcement between Americans and Europeans and criticism from
those very nations the United States has pressured to enforce
copyright protections. At the time the FMLA was passed, there was
concern that the United States would be violating its international
obligations:
The Congress has been advised by the Secretary of
Commerce that the fairness in music licensing reform
treaty
international
U.S.
legislation violates
Trade
Representative,
The
United
States
obligations.
the Register of Copyrights, and the ... Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks have all joined with the
Secretary of Commerce in voicing concerns [that the
bill] would "violate our obligations under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works." As a consequence, it could result in the WTO
finding that United States has violated its multilateral
treaty obligations. Adequate attention was not given
to these concerns.242
These fears have come true and now it is time for Congress to
decide how to fix the situation. Either it can accept the WTO's

242. 144 Cong. Rec. E2255 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Tanner).
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recommendations and repeal the business exemption, thus honoring
U.S. international treaty obligations, or it can refuse, with negative
repercussions for both the more minor financial copyright
administration and the greater international relations levels.
Will the United States take this opportunity to revise the § 110(5)
exemption, or will Congress choose instead to pay potentially
increasing damages? The original homestyle exemption under the
1976 Act was very narrow in scope and specific in intent, but it was
greatly expanded with the FMLA. Rather than risk not passing the
entire 1998 Amendment, Congress bent to pressure from the
restaurant lobbies and included the additional exemption. Congress
now has the chance to remove the business exemption and keep the
other amendments contained in the FMLA. In doing so, it would
gracefully appease the restaurant lobbies while placing any blame on
the World Trade Organization. Congress also has the opportunity to
amend the current homestyle exemption to better define what
businesses may be covered, specifically the small "mom and pop"
stores that it originally intended to protect.

